How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down by Hunt, Jennifer
 
  
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down 
 
 
 
 
 
By: Jennifer Hunt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 836 
August 2006 
 
 
 
 
  
How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down
1 
 
 
 
Jennifer Hunt 
McGill University and NBER 
jennifer.hunt@mcgill.ca 
 
 
 
August 14, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using cross–country and Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly 
crime victims, are much more likely than non–victims to bribe public officials. 
Misfortune increases victims’ demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and 
also increases victims’ propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, 
possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly 
prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in 
bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect 
is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an 
increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus 
compound the misery brought by misfortune. 
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 How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down 
Jennifer Hunt 
Non-technical summary 
 
A combination of theoretical argument and empirical evidence has made a persuasive 
case that the high level of corruption in many developing countries reduces efficiency. 
Development specialists also fear that corruption reduces equity, in particular, that the 
poor pay a higher share of their income in bribes. In this paper I explore a different 
dimension of equity. I document the degree to which people pay bribes in connection 
with misfortune or adverse events they experience, with the consequence that the expense 
and possible disutility of bribery compound the original problem. I do so by using the 
International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS), with individual--level data from 37 
transition, middle or low--income countries, and the Peruvian Household Survey 
(ENAHO), both of which contain information on bribery of public officials. 
  
Misfortune or adverse events can lead an individual or household to bribe simply by 
increasing their need for public services. For example, victims of crime will want to 
report the crime to the police, an act that may require a bribe to ensure police 
cooperation. Individuals or households with such problems may also be more likely to 
bribe than other users of the same public officials, however. They may be more 
vulnerable to extortion or more willing to bribe than other users. Alternatively, those who 
have just experienced an adverse event may use particularly corruption-prone services 
within a particular institution, such as the establishment of eligibility for welfare. 
 
I find that victims of misfortune, especially victims of crime, are substantially more likely 
to bribe than others, even after controlling for a wide range of individual and household 
characteristics and household fixed effects. By contrast, victimization has no statistically 
significant effect on the amount paid in bribes, conditional on having paid a bribe. In the 
ICVS data, I find that crime victims are between 2.9 and 8.2 percentage points more 
likely to bribe an official than similar non-victims, depending on the crime, compared to 
an overall bribery rate of 12.5%. In Peru, a crime victim is 6.3 percentage points more 
likely to bribe than a similar non-victim, compared to an overall bribery rate of 4.9%. For 
victims of other misfortunes, the corresponding increase in the bribery rate generally lies 
between 2.2 percentage points for a job loss and 3.8 percentage points for the death of a 
household earner, although natural disasters have no effect and unspecified other 
misfortunes have an 8.9 percentage point effect. For victims of all misfortunes, the 
increase in bribery is highest for bribes paid to the police. 
 
The results of the paper add to this limited knowledge of the process of bribery by 
individuals, and underline the extent to which corruption lowers the quality of life by 
compounding other miseries. The results also reinforce other studies emphasizing the 
importance of combatting corruption in the police force, which is itself often set the task 
of reducing corruption in society. A combination of theoretical argument and empirical evidence has made a persuasive
case that the high level of corruption in many developing countries reduces eﬃciency. For
example, Mauro (1995) and later papers have shown that corruption reduces growth, and
Wei (2000) has shown that corruption reduces foreign direct investment. Development
specialists also fear that corruption reduces equity. In this context, the burden of cor-
ruption is usually considered inequitable or regressive if the poor pay a higher fraction of
their income in bribes than the rich. Evidence on this point has only recently begun to
emerge, and reveals diﬀerent results for diﬀerent countries: Hunt and Laszlo (2006) show
that the burden of bribery is approximately constant by income in Peru, whereas Herrera
et al. (2005) show that the burden is regressive in several African countries.
In this paper I explore a diﬀerent dimension of equity. I document the degree to
which people pay bribes in connection with misfortune or adverse events they experience,
with the consequence that the expense and possible disutility of bribery compound the
original problem. I do so by using the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS), with
individual–level data from 37 transition, middle or low–income countries, and the Peruvian
Household Survey (ENAHO), both of which contain information on bribery of public
oﬃcials. The data sets are complementary, as the ICVS covers many countries and has
detailed information on crime, while the Peruvian data set has a wealth of non–crime
covariates and detailed information on bribery and especially use of public oﬃcials.
Misfortune or adverse events can lead an individual or household to bribe simply by
increasing their need for public services. For example, victims of crime will want to report
the crime to the police, an act that may require a bribe to ensure police cooperation. An
illness, accident or assault may lead the victim to use public hospitals, which could involve
a bribe to jump a queue or see a doctor. If a household member dies, his or her death
must be registered, for which a bribe might be extorted. Burglary, robbery, fraud, job loss,
ﬁre, natural disasters, the death of an earner and the bankruptcy of a shop involve the
loss of possessions or income, which may impoverish the aﬀected individual or household
and lead them to apply for unemployment insurance or welfare. The desertion of the
household head can lead to legal issues concerning alimony or child custody, while the
1creditors of a bankrupt shopkeeper may appeal to a judge. Involvement with the courts
may be associated with bribery, for example of the opponent’s lawyer.
Individuals or households with such problems may also be more likely to bribe than
other users of the same public oﬃcials, however. They may be more vulnerable to extor-
tion or more willing to bribe than other users. Alternatively, the heterogeneity of services
provided by an institution such as the municipal government may be relevant: those who
have just experienced an adverse event may use particularly corruption–prone services
within a particular institution, such as the establishment of eligibility for welfare.
It is diﬃcult to judge which misfortunes and problems are most likely to lead to
increased bribery. The magnitude of the eﬀect would depend not only on the severity of
the problem, but also on the degree of corruption of the institution to which victims would
have recourse. As the police force is a very corrupt institution in many countries, problems
with which the police would be associated, such as crime, could be expected to lead to
frequent bribery. The purpose of the paper, however, is to demonstrate the relevance of
a wide range of adverse events for bribery, rather than to emphasize diﬀerences between
adverse events.
I ﬁnd that victims of misfortune, especially victims of crime, are substantially more
likely to bribe than others, even after controlling for a wide range of individual and
household characteristics. By contrast, victimization has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the amount paid in bribes, conditional on having paid a bribe. In the ICVS data, I
ﬁnd that crime victims are between 2.9 and 8.2 percentage points more likely to bribe an
oﬃcial than similar non–victims, depending on the crime, compared to an overall bribery
rate of 12.5%. In Peru, a crime victim is 6.3 percentage points more likely to bribe
than a similar non–victim, compared to an overall bribery rate of 4.9%. For victims of
other misfortunes, the corresponding increase in the bribery rate generally lies between
2.2 percentage points for a job loss and 3.8 percentage points for the death of a household
earner, although natural disasters have no eﬀect and unspeciﬁed other misfortunes have
an 8.9 percentage point eﬀect. For victims of all misfortunes, the increase in bribery is
highest for bribes paid to the police. While it is possible that those prone to misfortune
2have unobservable characteristics making them more likely to bribe, the Peruvian results
are almost all robust to adding household ﬁxed eﬀects to the subsample that is a panel:
only the eﬀect of serious illness appears to be overstated in the absence of ﬁxed eﬀects,
while the eﬀect of natural disasters may be understated.
The Peruvian data show that victims bribe more not only because they use more
oﬃcials, but also because they bribe more than other users of the same oﬃcials. For the
pairing of crime victims and the police, the combination with one of the highest bribery
rates, the entire eﬀect operates through greater use of the police. But for many pairings
of misfortune and public oﬃcial, the higher bribery compared to other users is at least
as important as greater usage. This is true for victims of crime or shop bankruptcy in
connection with the judiciary, and also for many victim types in connection with the
municipal government.
In the case of crime victims and the police, it is evident that some of the higher usage
must come from reporting the crime to the police. This appears not to be the only reason
for increased usage, however, as the ICVS data indicate that crime victims who report
their crime to the police do not have higher (or lower) bribery of the police than victims
who do not report their crime. The Peruvian and ICVS results together suggest that
crime victims who do not report their crime have an elevated police usage rate for reasons
other than reporting. One possibility is that many unreported crimes are unreported
because they are in fact perpetrated by the police. Another is that crime victims tend
also to be perpetrators, and therefore come into contact with the police in their capacity
as perpetrators, while being disinclined to report their own victimization to the police.
Individual micro–data have previously been used to show that richer households pay
more frequent and larger bribes than poorer households, that people who know how to
report corruption bribe less and that although bribers generally receive worse service,
narrow beneﬁts from bribing can be identiﬁed.1 The results of the paper add to this
limited knowledge of the process of bribery by individuals, and underline the extent to
1See Deininger and Mpuga (2005) for Uganda, Hunt (2006) for Peruvian hospitals, Hunt (2004) for the
ICVS countries, Hunt and Laszlo (2006) for Peru and Thompson and Xavier (2002) for Kazakh hospitals.
3which corruption lowers the quality of life by compounding other miseries. The results
also reinforce other studies emphasizing the importance of combatting corruption in the
police force, which is itself often set the task of reducing corruption in society.
1 Data
I use data from two sources: the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) and the
Peruvian household survey (ENAHO). In low–corruption countries, stigma may prevent
respondents from answering honestly concerning bribery, so I drop high–income countries
surveyed in the ICVS (see the Data Appendix for further discussion). In more corrupt
countries, however, bribery is viewed as inevitable and the fault of the system, so stigma
is low. Fear of prosecution (at least for small bribes, which are the majority of bribes)
should also be low, as most anti–corruption campaigns target oﬃcials.
1.1 International Crime Victim Surveys
I use data spanning 1992–2001 on transition, middle and low–income countries from the
International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS), conducted for the United Nations Interre-
gional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Interviews were conducted face–to–face with
a randomly selected member of the household who reported his or her own individual vic-
timization experience. About 60% of the observations are from countries making the
transition from communism: Appendix Table 1 lists the full set of countries. Peru was
not surveyed. In many countries the ICVS surveyed only particular neighborhoods, in the
capital city. Neighborhoods were chosen based on economic status, rather than randomly,
although the samples are random within neighborhoods.
The survey focuses on the details of respondents’ experiences of criminal victimization
in the previous calendar year, but also inquires about bribery in the previous calendar
year. The question asked is: “In some countries, there is a problem of corruption among
government or public oﬃcials. During 199x, has any government oﬃcial, for instance a
customs oﬃcer, a police oﬃcer or inspector in your country asked you, or expected you
4to pay a bribe for his or her services?”. Respondents who answer yes are then asked what
type of government oﬃcial was bribed (somewhat oddly, the ﬁrst option is “government
oﬃcial”). The amount of the bribe is not asked. More importantly, the survey does not
ask respondents if they used any public oﬃcial in the past year: respondents who used
but did not bribe an oﬃcial cannot be distinguished from non–users. I use a sample of
55,019 individuals.
1.2 Peru’s Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
The Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) is a household survey oversampling rural
areas, conducted yearly by Peru’s national statistical agency, the Instituto Nacional de
Estad´ ıstica e Informaci´ on (INEI). I use the 2002 and 2003 surveys, which each contain
over 18,000 households. In these years, the ENAHO included a module on governance in
which one randomly chosen adult per household is asked numerous questions pertaining
to the household’s use of 21 diﬀerent types of oﬃcials or institutions. If a particular
type of oﬃcial was used in the previous twelve months, respondents are asked a series
of questions in connection with use and bribery of this oﬃcial type in this time–frame,
including whether the oﬃcial asked for a bribe, gift, tip or “coima” (slang for bribe),
whether the respondent felt obliged to make such a payment, made such a payment
voluntarily, or refused to make such a payment, and the amount paid if she paid.
One quarter of the addresses surveyed in 2002 were also surveyed in 2003, and an
indicator is provided to identify the cases where the household was the same in the
two surveys. It is therefore possible to use a small panel of households. The mean
characteristics of the panel households are virtually identical to the means of the full
sample. The Data Appendix provides further information on the ENAHO data set.
2 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A column 1 of Table 1 shows that 46% of ICVS respondents reported having been a
victim in the previous calendar year of one or more of the ﬁve main crime types: assault,
5burglary, larceny, robbery and fraud. These crime victims account for 70% of all bribes
(column 2), reﬂecting victims’ bribery rate of 19.0%, compared to only 6.9% for non–
victims (column 3). Panel B shows the equivalent for the Peruvian data. The Peruvian
outcome of interest on which I focus is having bribed or refused to bribe, which I term a
bribery episode. I include refusals in part because some may represent actual payments
that respondents are reluctant to report, and in part because attempted bribery is also
of interest. As shown in column 1, 20% of respondents reported that their household
had been the victim of one of nine misfortunes in the previous twelve months. These
victims accounted for 37% of bribery episodes (column 2). This overrepresentation reﬂects
the 8.9% bribery (episode) rate for victim households compared with the 3.9% bribery
(episode) rate for non–victim households (column 3).
Table 2 column 1 shows the share of individuals or households who were victims of
the detailed misfortunes. In the ICVS (panel A), the most common crime by far is fraud,
of which 29.4% of respondents were victim. The most common Peruvian misfortune
(panel B) is natural disaster (such as drought etc.), of which 5.4% were victims. The least
common misfortune is ﬁre, aﬀecting only 0.1%. A comparison of column 1 and column 2 in
both panels shows that victims are generally two to three times overrepresented amongst
bribers, with the exception of victims of natural disasters, who are not overrepresented.
The bottom of column 1 shows that 13% of Peruvian households were victims who reported
losing income as a result, 3.1% were victims reporting losing goods, and 2.6% were victims
who reported losing both.
Columns 3–6 provide means of characteristics of households and individuals who were
victims of the detailed misfortunes (and the means for those who were victim of no
misfortune). Columns 3–5 of panel A shows that victims of crimes in the ICVS are more
educated than non–victims, much more likely to be in a town with a population over one
million, and slightly younger than non–victims. Column 6 shows that robbery was most
frequently considered to be very serious by the victim (43% considered their robbery to be
very serious, rather than fairly or not serious or unknown), while larceny was considered
less serious than burglary and assault (fraud victims were not asked about the gravity of
6their crime). Panel B, for Peru, indicates that respondents in crime victim households
have similar education to non–victims and, oddly, that crime victims are only slightly
more likely to be in cities with over 500,000 people than non–victims. The respondents
are not younger than respondents in non–victim households, but the respondent is not
necessarily the victim.
Respondents in job loss and shop bankruptcy households are considerably more ed-
ucated than non–victims (panel B), and job losers are much more likely to live in large
cities than non–victims. To have a shop bankruptcy one must be a shopkeeper, a rel-
atively skilled job, and a job loss implies dependent employment, which is on average
more skilled than self–employment. By contrast, victims of natural disaster are much less
educated than non–victims and do not live in cities. As these farmers have such diﬀerent
observable characteristics from other victims, they may also have diﬀerent unobservable
characteristics. Column 6 of panel B shows that for most misfortunes, more than half of
households reported a fall in their standard of living over the previous year (in response
to a question asked not long after the misfortunes question), compared to only 23% of
non–victim households. The least serious misfortunes in this regard are natural disaster,
ﬁre and crime, for which only 35–39% victims reported a fall in living standard.
Table 3 provides information on the types of oﬃcial or institution bribed. In both
data sets, the police receive the highest share of bribes, with 34–35% of the total. In
Peru, at least, their large share of bribes is not the result of many users, since only 5.5%
of households used the police in the previous twelve months (column 2 panel B), but is
owing to the large share of users who bribe: 37.2% (column 3). For the judiciary the
picture is similar, as only 4.1% of households used the judiciary, but the 16.6% of users
who bribed brought the judiciary’s share of bribes to 12% of the total. The municipal
government and state schools, by contrast, have a large share of the bribes because of
high usage rates. Together, these four oﬃcial types account for 76% of all bribes in Peru.
Appendix Table 2 presents the means of all variables used in regressions with the ICVS
data, while Appendix Tables 3 and 4 present the means of all variables used in regressions
with the ENAHO data.
73 Empirical Methodology
3.1 ICVS
The basic regression for the ICVS is a probit for the probability of an individual i in
country c paying a bribe in year t:
P(bribeict) = Cictβ1 + Xictβ2 + δt + γc + ict. (1)
Cict contains dummies indicating whether the individual was a victim of ﬁve main crime
types, and the coeﬃcients β1 are the coeﬃcients of interest. All speciﬁcations include
three year dummies (δt) and country dummies (γc). Since some neighborhoods are chosen
based on city size and neighborhood aﬄuence, I present only speciﬁcations that control for
the respondent’s income quartile and city size among the X controls.2 All speciﬁcations
also control for dummies for the size of the household (to adjust household income, to
adjust for the under–representation of large households introduced by interviewing only
one household member, and to take into account the number of people on whose behalf
the respondent might potentially pay bribes). I adjust the standard errors to allow for
correlation among observations in the same region of a country (to allow for serial cor-
relation where more than one year of data on a region is present), and report marginal
eﬀects.
I then investigate how the determinants of bribes vary according to the recipient of
the bribe by estimating multinomial logits with six categories: the ﬁrst (omitted) for no
bribe paid, and the remaining ﬁve for bribes paid to the ﬁve types of oﬃcial.3 I report
odds ratios (exponentiated coeﬃcients).
2I would like to control for the aﬄuence of the neighborhood, but the regions I observe are generally
considerably larger than the neighborhoods in question.
3In the multinomial logits the coeﬃcients on the dummies of three low–bribery countries are ill-
conditioned for some categories of oﬃcial, so I group them with a neighboring country.
83.2 Peru’s ENAHO
I estimate a similar probit for the probability that ENAHO household h in region r bribes
an oﬃcial type o in year t:
P(bribe episodehrot) = Mhrtβ3o + Xhrtβ4o + tt + γr + ηhrot. (2)
M contains dummies for nine misfortunes of which the household might have been a
victim, and its coeﬃcients β3o are the coeﬃcients of interest. The 2003 survey year is
represented by tt, and γr represents 24 region dummies. Since sampling is stratiﬁed by
city size, I only present speciﬁcations that include city size dummies among the X controls.
I estimate ﬁve sets of probits for o representing any oﬃcial, police, judiciary, municipal
government and state schools. I adjust the standard errors to allow for correlation within
districts (which are smaller than regions) and report marginal eﬀects.
I also estimate a related probit where the seventeen oﬃcials other than police, ju-
diciary, municipal government and schools are pooled, and the unit of observation is a
household–oﬃcial pair, rather than a household. In this case, I always present speciﬁca-
tions controlling for oﬃcial type dummies νo:
P(bribe episodehrot) = Mhrtβ5 + Xhrtβ6 + tt + γr + νo + ζhrot. (3)
Despite the rich set of covariates for which I control, it is possible that in both (2)
and (3) the coeﬃcients on the crimes and other misfortunes are biased by the omission
of variables. For example, if risk lovers are more likely to have shops, or if risk–loving
shopkeepers are more likely to go bankrupt, and risk lovers always bribe more, the eﬀect
of shop bankruptcy on bribery will be biased upward by the omission of risk aversion.
To the extent that risk aversion is a ﬁxed eﬀect, the bias caused by its omission may be
removed by using the panel subsample of the data to estimate household ﬁxed eﬀects δh.
The reduction in the sample size means that this is only meaningful for estimating the
probability of bribing any oﬃcial:
P(bribe episodehrot) = Mhrtβ7o + Xhrtβ8o + tt + γr + δh + φhrot. (4)
9I estimate this as a linear probability model. If the misfortune is so great as to change,
say, a risk–lover into a risk–averse person, the bias caused by the omission of the original
risk–aversion cannot be diﬀerenced out with ﬁxed eﬀects.4
While in principle the data permit a distinction between types of bribe and especially
between bribes and refusals to bribe, in practice running multinomial logits instead of
probits leads to large standard errors and insigniﬁcant marginal eﬀects, so I do not pursue
this.
It would be informative to present a decomposition of the unconditional bribery eﬀect:
if a household that is a victim of misfortune bribes more, this could be either because it
simply uses more oﬃcials (which indirectly increases bribery), because it is more likely to
bribe the oﬃcials it uses than other users, or some combination of the two. As a ﬁrst step I
rerun the regressions above changing the dependent variable to the probability of using an
oﬃcial, then rerun the bribery regressions above with the sample of households who used
the oﬃcial. Using the results of these regressions for a decomposition would be a simple
matter were they linear. The probability of a bribery episode P(B) is the product of the
probability of using the oﬃcial P(U) and the probability of a bribery episode conditional
on using the oﬃcial P(B|U):
Pj(B) = Pj(U) Pj(B|U), (5)
where j represents V , for victims, or NV , for non–victims. The bribery gap between
victims and non–victims is
PV(B) − PNV(B) = PV(U) PV(B|U) − PNV(U) PNV(B|U), (6)
which can be rewritten as
PV(U)∆P(B|U) + PNV(B|U)∆P(U). (7)
4Even if the household is the same in the two survey years, the respondent may not be. To the extent
that the change in respondent changes the information conveyed, household ﬁxed eﬀects may not capture
all relevant ﬁxed eﬀects. A matching algorithm would be needed to construct respondent ﬁxed eﬀects.
10This decomposition is also valid conditional on X. However, it is not valid for non–
linear regressions such as probits. Owing to the low probabilities often involved in the
regressions, probit and linear probability estimates of coeﬃcients diﬀer, so I prefer to
use probits and forgo an exact decomposition. However, I calculate P(U)∆P(B|U,X)
and P(B|U)∆P(U|X), and call these the conditional bribery and usage components,
even though they only approximately sum to ∆P(B|X). I calculate the share due to
conditional bribery by calculating its share of the sum of the two components.
4 Results
4.1 ICVS
Table 4 reports the marginal eﬀects, multiplied by 100, of criminal victimization on the
unconditional probability of bribery in the ICVS. In column 1, the only other covariates are
income quartile, household and city size dummies, while the remaining relevant individual
and household covariates available in the ICVS are added in column 2. Whether the
individual had been a victim of assault, burglary, larceny, robbery or consumer fraud in
the previous year is strongly positively associated with the payment of bribes. The eﬀects
in column 1 range from 3.4 percentage points for bribery to 9.0 percentage points for fraud,
compared to an overall bribery rate of 12.5%. The addition of the covariates in column 2
reduces the marginal eﬀect of assault and larceny the most, and the magnitudes of the
eﬀects range from 2.9–3.1 percentage points for burglary and larceny to 8.2 percentage
points for fraud. Although Table 2 indicated that victims consider robbery to be the most
serious non–fraud crime, the eﬀect of assault is as large as that for robbery.
One explanation for the victimization eﬀects is that victims have to bribe the police
when reporting the crime. This can be tested by adding to the speciﬁcation interactions
between the crimes and whether they were reported to the police, and checking whether
the coeﬃcients on the interactions are signiﬁcantly positive. None of the interactions in
column 3 has a signiﬁcant marginal eﬀect, and all except for fraud have a small point
estimate. The interactions’ marginal eﬀects are also insigniﬁcant when the regressions are
11run on a sample of victims only, when controls for whether the victim viewed the crime
as very serious are added, and when larceny is broken down into its ﬁve component parts
(these results are not reported).5
In column 4, I repeat the column 2 analysis using an expanded sample including
surveys with inconsistent or missing information on the type of oﬃcial bribed (which is
not relevant for this table). The results are very similar in the two columns. In column 5,
I repeat the speciﬁcation of column 2 with the sample of Latin American countries, which
may be more similar to Peru. The eﬀect of assault appears larger in Latin America, but
otherwise the results are similar. In unreported regressions, the eﬀects of victimization in
Latin America also do not vary according to whether the crime was reported or not.
In Table 5 I examine the eﬀect of criminal victimization on the bribery of various types
of oﬃcial. The odds ratios in Table 5 are from a single multinomial logit, with an omitted
category of no bribe. The full covariates are included. The top left odds ratio of 1.96,
for example, means that a person who is the victim of assault is about twice as likely to
bribe a government oﬃcial as not to bribe (96% more likely), by comparison with a non–
victim. The odds ratios are rather similar across columns, meaning that victimization
causes similar percent changes in the probability of bribing various oﬃcial types, rather
than being higher for the police. This issue is discussed further below. The largest eﬀects
are for fraud, where the odds ratios are all above two, and the smallest eﬀects are for
larceny, where the odds ratios reﬂect bribery probabilities higher by only 31–59%.
In unreported multinomial logits, I have added interactions of the crimes with whether
they were reported, to test whether crime victimization increases bribery through report-
ing. Of the 25 interactions, only four were signiﬁcant, and one of these was signiﬁcantly
negative. I return to this puzzle later in the paper.
5Coeﬃcients on interactions for reporting the crime to an authority other than the police are also
insigniﬁcant. Controlling for these greatly reduces the sample size, however.
124.2 Peru’s ENAHO
I begin by examining in some detail the eﬀect of criminal victimization in the ENAHO in
Tables 6–8, before turning to the eﬀect of other misfortunes and adverse events.
4.2.1 Criminal Victimization
Each marginal eﬀect in Table 6 (columns 1–4) is the marginal eﬀect on criminal victim-
ization from a diﬀerent probit for the unconditional probability of a bribery episode. As
in all subsequent tables, the marginal eﬀects are multiplied by 100 and therefore represent
percentage point eﬀects.
In Table 6, as in Tables 7 and 8, I begin by controlling only for city size, year and
other misfortunes (column 1). I then add many other characteristics of the household and
the household respondent to the bribery questions (column 2), avoiding controlling for
the value of household consumption, which is endogenous to misfortune, or variables that
would proxy for consumption. In column 3 I control for dummies representing whether
the household respondent reported that the household’s living standard had risen or
fallen over the previous twelve months, as well as for the equivalent questions for the
community/town. It is possible that the misfortune dummies simply pick up the behavior
of all households with a drop in their living standard and who might therefore qualify
for welfare, for example. Finally, in column 4 I control for household consumption, the
types of vehicles owned by the family (an important determinant of bribery to the police),
the type of job held by the household respondent (self–employed in agriculture etc.) and
dummies for whether the household received food aid in particular locations. The latter
dummies include dummies for receiving food aid through the municipality or as a school
breakfast or lunch. Because of the endogeneity of household consumption to misfortune,
column 4 arguably overcontrols: consumption could fall in response to losses in income
or wealth, or could rise temporarily as lost possessions are replaced.
Panel A shows the eﬀect of criminal victimization on the probability of bribing (or
refusing to bribe) any type of oﬃcial. With minimal covariates (column 1) the eﬀect
13is 8.1 percentage points, while with maximum covariates (column 4) the eﬀect is 6.3
percentage points, compared to an overall bribery episode probability of 4.9%. This large
eﬀect is similar to the eﬀect of crime victimization found in the ICVS (between 2.9 and
8.2 percentage points in Table 4), where overall bribery is higher at 12.5%. The larger
Peruvian eﬀect relative to overall bribery is consistent with the possibility that the less
detailed questioning of the ENAHO probably elicits reports of more serious crimes.
Panels B–F of Table 6 estimate the probability of a bribery episode for the four major
oﬃcial types and the seventeen pooled minor oﬃcials. One can see looking down the
columns that the largest eﬀects of criminal victimization are for the police, as would
be expected, followed by the judiciary, municipal government, and schools. The eﬀects
for minor oﬃcials are almost an order of magnitude smaller. In column 4, the eﬀect
of criminal victimization on the police is 2.8 percentage points (panel B), a large eﬀect
compared to the 2.0% of households who bribe the police. The eﬀect for the judiciary is
1.4 percentage points (panel C), also large compared to the 0.7% of households who bribe
the judiciary.
The results of Table 6 may appear to contradict the ICVS results of Table 5, which
showed that criminal victimization increased bribery by a similar magnitude for each
oﬃcial type. However, the multinomial logit of Table 5 gives results in terms of the
percent increase in the probability, rather than the percentage point increases given in
Table 6. The percent increases for the oﬃcials in Table 6 (column 4) are 140%, 200%, 58%,
40% and 47% for the police, judiciary, municipal government, schools and minor oﬃcials
respectively. This transformation shows that the ICVS and ENAHO results are more
similar than they appear, even if the ENAHO shows stronger evidence that the police
and judiciary are more aﬀected than other oﬃcials. The percentage point eﬀects are more
important for policy purposes, as they reﬂect how much overall bribery is increasing.
It is possible that criminal victimization is correlated with unobserved variables that
cause individuals or households to bribe more. This may be tested by rerunning the
regressions of Table 6 column 4 with the 4518 households for which two years of data
are available, adding household ﬁxed eﬀects (I do not report these results). For the
14probability of bribing any oﬃcial, the probit marginal eﬀect of criminal victimization
is 2.1 percentage points (t-statistic of 2.4) without ﬁxed eﬀects; the linear probability
equivalent is 3.3 percentage points (t-statistic of 2.1) and the linear ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcient
is 3.0 percentage points (t-statistic of 1.7). Thus, although adding ﬁxed eﬀects increases
the standard error, the point estimate changes little. The results are similar if ﬁxed eﬀects
are added to the speciﬁcation of column 3 instead of column 4, suggesting that unobserved
heterogeneity is not an important issue. The number of bribes for this subsample is small
enough that little is signiﬁcant when oﬃcial types are examined separately.
I now turn to investigating how much of the unconditional bribery episode eﬀects
uncovered in Table 6 are the result of diﬀerences in usage of oﬃcials, and how much are
the result of diﬀerences in bribery conditional on use of the oﬃcial in question. The probits
of Table 7 examine the probability of a bribery episode conditional on using an oﬃcial.
Panel A shows that for the police, there is no signiﬁcant conditional bribery eﬀect, and in
fact, the point estimates are negative. For the judiciary (panel B), on the contrary, there
is a very large conditional bribery eﬀect that is not explained by covariates: in column 4,
victims of crime are 15.3 percentage points more likely to bribe the judiciary than others
users of the judiciary, compared to a bribery rate among users of 16.6%. There is a smaller
signiﬁcant eﬀect of 2.1 percentage points in column 4 for the municipal government (panel
C), compared to a bribery rate of 4.8%. The magnitude for schools and other oﬃcials are
also large relative to their bribery rates.
In Table 8 I return to the sample of all households, and examine the association
between criminal victimization and the probability of using an oﬃcial, in order to gauge
how much of the increase in unconditional bribery comes indirectly through increased use
of oﬃcials. There is a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect for all oﬃcial types. The eﬀect for
the police is very large (panel A): victims of crime are 11.3 percentage points more likely
to use the police than non–victims (column 4), compared to the 5.5% of households who
use the police. The eﬀects for the other three major oﬃcial types are 4–5 percentage
points (column 4), which is large compared to the judiciary usage rate (4.1%), but not
compared with the usage rate for the municipal governments and schools (25.6% and 53.9%
15respectively). The eﬀect of 0.75 percentage points for the minor oﬃcials (column 4) is
also small compared to their average usage rate of 9.7%.
The results of Tables 7 and 8 may be used to decompose the eﬀect of misfortune on
bribery into the indirect eﬀect of higher usage of oﬃcials and the direct eﬀect of higher
bribery relative to other users. The direct eﬀect of bribery represents -3% of the total
eﬀect for the police, 47% for the judiciary, 69% for the municipal government, and 87%
for schools.
Hunt (2004), who used the ICVS data only, proposed that the reason for increased
bribery of the police by crime victims regardless of whether they reported the crime was
that crime victims lived in distrustful environments that also fostered bribery. However,
as the Peruvian data show that the increased bribery comes wholly from a large increase
in the usage of police, this interpretation seems unlikely to be correct.
4.2.2 Victims of All Misfortunes
In Table 9 I present the marginal eﬀects of all nine misfortunes on the unconditional prob-
ability of a bribery episode. The marginal eﬀects come from the regressions of column 4
in Table 6. The synthesis of the many numbers is that most misfortunes increase bribery,
and bribes to many types of oﬃcial are aﬀected by many types of misfortune. The oﬃcial
type most aﬀected is the police, and crime is the misfortune with the largest eﬀect (apart
from “other misfortunes”), despite its being among the less severe misfortunes in Table 2
in terms of eﬀect on standard of living.
For the probability of a bribery episode in connection with any oﬃcial, column 1 shows
that the largest eﬀects are the previously reported eﬀect of criminal victimization, a 6.3
percentage point eﬀect, and the eﬀect of “other” misfortunes, a statistically indistinguish-
able 8.9 percentage point eﬀect. The marginal eﬀect of a ﬁre is large at 4.9 percentage
points, but the small number of ﬁres leads to large standard errors and insigniﬁcance.
Natural disasters have no signiﬁcant eﬀect, while the eﬀects of other misfortunes lie in a
range from 2.2 percentage points for a job loss to 3.8 percentage points for the death of
an earner (within this range the eﬀects are statistically indistinguishable).
16Seven of nine misfortunes signiﬁcantly increase the probability of bribing the police in
column 2, with only the desertion of a household head and natural disasters insigniﬁcant.
For the judiciary in column 3, the eﬀects are somewhat smaller and four of nine are
signiﬁcant. For the municipal government in column 4, the eﬀects are smaller still, and
although again four of nine are signiﬁcant, the pattern is diﬀerent from that for the
judiciary. For example, there is no eﬀect of shop bankruptcy, unlike for the judiciary,
whereas there is a signiﬁcant eﬀect of illness/accident, probably reﬂecting the use of
municipal medical clinics. Eﬀects for schools in column 5 are less signiﬁcant, while the
pooling of oﬃcials in column 6 leads to greater signiﬁcance despite much smaller eﬀects.
The ﬁxed eﬀects regressions on the panel subsample may again be used to shed light
on the importance of unobserved heterogeneity for the probability of bribing any oﬃcial
(these results are not reported). Adding ﬁxed eﬀects to a linear probability regression
reduces the coeﬃcient for three misfortunes, increases it for ﬁve misfortunes, and changes
it little for criminal victimization, suggesting there is no systematic upward bias. There is
a hint in the case of natural disasters and illness/accident that adding ﬁxed eﬀects makes
a qualitative diﬀerence, although the standard errors involved are large. For natural
disasters, the point estimate rises from 0.5 to 2.5 percentage points, with the latter eﬀect
signiﬁcant at the 11% level. The point estimate for illness or accident falls from 2.4 to
-0.8, but the former eﬀect is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
I also check the robustness of the Table 9 marginal eﬀects to reclassifying refusals
to bribe as a non–bribe rather than a bribe: refusals are 22% of bribery episodes. For
the bribery of any oﬃcial, the new marginal eﬀects are on average 94% of the column 1
eﬀects. The results for the police, municipal government and judiciary are also robust to
this change.
As with criminal victimization, I am interested in how much of the increase in bribery
caused by misfortune is caused by greater use of oﬃcials, and how much is caused by
increased bribery compared to other users. However, the latter eﬀect (corresponding to
the regressions of Table 7) is insigniﬁcant for most misfortunes and for schools. I therefore
present results in Table 10 for selected misfortunes and oﬃcials with larger such eﬀects.
17All marginal eﬀects in odd columns examining the probability of using an oﬃcial are
statistically signiﬁcant except one. The largest eﬀect (even considering the unreported
misfortune eﬀects) is for the pairing of criminal victimization and the police: a crime
victim is 11.3 percentage points more likely to use the police, compared to an overall
usage rate of 5.5%. Next largest are all the “other” misfortune eﬀects, which range from
6.2 percentage points for the police to 9.0 percentage points for municipal government.6
Two misfortunes have a very large eﬀect on the probability of bribing the judiciary
conditional on using the judiciary (column 4). Criminal victimization raises the prob-
ability by 15.3 percentage points, as already reported, and a shop bankruptcy raises it
by 12.3 percentage points, compared to the bribery rate of 16.6% among judiciary users.
“Other” victimization raises conditional bribery of the police by 14.8 percentage points
(though this is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level, column 2), and several misfortunes raise
conditional bribery of the municipal government by statistically signiﬁcant amounts that
are large compared with the conditional bribery rate of 4.8%: “other”, illness/accident
and crime (column 6).
In Table 11 I report the share of the overall bribery eﬀect due to higher bribery of
victims compared to other users (conditional bribery), for the misfortunes and oﬃcials of
Table 10. The ﬁrst row repeats numbers for criminal victimization cited in the text above.
For the other four misfortunes, this component represents only a quarter of the eﬀect on
the police. For the judiciary the results are more varied. For job loss, illness/accident and
“other”, most of the eﬀect comes through usage, while for shop bankruptcy and crime
about half the eﬀect is conditional bribery and half usage. For the municipal government,
the shop bankruptcy eﬀect comes mostly through usage, while for the other misfortunes
the eﬀects comes mostly through conditional bribery.
I have extended the analysis to seek eﬀects of misfortune on the amount of a bribe
6Almost all misfortunes increase the usage of the police, judiciary and municipal government. The
pairings for which the relationship is insigniﬁcant are ﬁre–judiciary and sickness/accident–municipal
government. Most misfortunes do not statistically signiﬁcantly increase the usage of schools, while almost
all increase the usage of the pooled other oﬃcials.
18paid, conditional on a bribe being paid. However, all marginal eﬀects are insigniﬁcant,
owing to the limited sample size and associated large standard errors.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I show that victims of misfortune and adverse events, particularly crime
victims, are much more likely to bribe than non–victims. This holds even after condition-
ing on a variety of individual and household characteristics, as well as household ﬁxed
eﬀects. The results hold with both cross–country and Peruvian micro–data. Victims of
misfortune are more likely than non–victims to use public oﬃcials, particularly the po-
lice, which indirectly leads to more bribery. However, in many situations victims also
bribe more than other users who are not victims. In such cases, victims may be more
vulnerable or more desperate for service than other users, or they may have need of a
more corrupt service (for example, establishing eligibility for beneﬁts) than non–victims
using the same institution. Whichever route leads the victim to the corrupt interaction
with the oﬃcial, the expense or disutility associated with the interaction compounds the
original misfortune. People encounter corruption at the most diﬃcult times of their lives,
which is a form of inequity.
Misfortune especially spurs bribery of the police and judiciary. Of note among the
detailed results is the frequent bribery of police by crime victims, caused by victims’ very
high use of police. The puzzle is that this high use or contact is apparently not principally
the result of the reporting of crimes to the police, raising the possibility that the police
commit crimes or that crime victims are also perpetrators of crime. The frequent bribery
of the judiciary by crime victims and bankrupt shopkeepers is distinctive for the important
role played by higher bribery compared to other users, as is the bribery of the municipal
government by victims of several misfortunes.
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206 Data Appendix
6.1 International Crime Victim Surveys ICVS
The data are available at www.unicri.it/wwd/analysis/icvs/data.php.
I wish to drop countries with a suﬃciently low bribery rate that stigma would impede
honest answers to the survey. Low bribery countries are almost all rich countries, and
I prefer to use GDP per capita as the criterion for inclusion rather than bribery, which
will be the dependent variable. This means South Korea and Malta are excluded despite
having higher bribery than two included countries. I include Slovenia, whose GDP per
capita is similar to that of Malta and South Korea but whose bribery rate is lower, in
order to include the complete set of European ex-communist countries. For most of the
analysis I also drop 19 surveys (ﬁve of them for countries not otherwise represented in the
sample) where the list of oﬃcial types presented to respondents who bribed was longer
than in the other surveys, or where the oﬃcial type information was missing.
I recode victims of crimes occurring abroad as non–victims. In many of the surveys of
cities, the variable called city size appeared to refer to the population of the neighborhood,
not the city, or was missing. Using www.citypopulation.de and the region variable, I
corrected these observations.
6.2 Peru’s ENAHO
The data are available at www.inei.gob.pe/srienaho/English/Consulta por Encuesta.asp.
The 2002 survey was taken in October, November and December of 2002. The “2003”
survey was taken from May 2003 to April 2004. One quarter of the 2003 households
were also interviewed in 2002. I simply combine monetary values from surveys taken at
diﬀerent times with no adjustment for inﬂation or seasonality, which tests indicated was
appropriate for household consumption. A noteworthy discrepancy between 2002 and
2003 is a leap in the share of households reporting in the bribery module that they had
used a state hospital, apparently due to more complete reporting. Whenever I control
for oﬃcial type dummies, I therefore also permit an interaction of the state hospital
dummy with a dummy for the survey year 2003. Household consumption, computed
by the statistical agency, is based on the survey’s 31 pages of questions on household
expenditure and consumption. The bribery module was also included in the 2004 and
2005 surveys, but the bribery data have not been released with the rest of the data.
The twenty–one types of oﬃcial listed in the survey are: municipal government, social
security (providing social insurance other than pensions), state banks, judiciary, drinking
water, telephone, electricity, state schools, arbitration, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry
of Industry and Tourism, tax/customs authority (SUNAT), state hospitals, national civil
identiﬁcation registry, Department of Migration, police, electoral oﬃce (ONPE), electoral
court (JNE), development agency (FONCODES), food agency (PRONAA), and “other”.
216.3 Are the bribery rates plausible?
While the bribery rates in some of the ICVS surveys are low – only 1.4% in Slovenia and
3.0–3.1% in Botswana and Hungary, for example – the high bribery rates in some countries
suggest respondents were not afraid to answer the ICVS questions. The Peruvian ENAHO
bribery (episode) rate of 4.9% is lower than the lowest ICVS Latin American bribery rate
(of 5.3% for Argentina in 2001), raising the possibility that respondents may have been
less eager to answer a government–sponsored survey. However, the ENAHO bribery
episode rates for some oﬃcial types are very high (37% for the police), indicating that,
at least for some oﬃcial types, respondents were not ashamed or afraid to acknowledge
a bribery episode. The stigma associated with bribery in Peru is not large: Pro´ etica,
a Peruvian anti–corruption group, found that when asked to deﬁne the Peruvian slang
for bribe (“coima”), less than half their survey respondents gave answers with a negative
connotation.7 Furthermore, the Peruvian household survey does not attempt to force
respondents to admit to having voluntarily paid a bribe, but allows them merely to
acknowledge having paid a tip under duress. I therefore do not believe that reluctance to
report is a major issue.
A 2004 Transparency International survey of 416 respondents in greater Lima found
14% of respondents had bribed in the previous twelve months, compared to 6.0 per cent
among the 3758 Lima respondents in my 2002–2003 data.8 However, the Transparency
question did not restrict itself to bribes paid to public oﬃcials. Pro´ etica reports much
higher bribery rates for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 of 32%, 29% and 27%, respectively.9
Pro´ etica’s bribery rates, conditional on the use of particular oﬃcials, look very similar to
those in my data, but their usage rates look implausibly high for a window of one year.
This suggests that the Pro´ etica time frame, not reported in the documentation available
to me, was in fact much longer than a year, even though yearly bribery rates are reported.
The share of households or individuals bribing and the number of bribes will be un-
derstated if clients commonly use agents to act as intermediaries between themselves and
oﬃcials, and bribes paid by the agent are reported in the survey by the agent (or no-one),
rather than the client. A 2003 survey by Pro´ etica gathered information on bribes and
agents (“tramitadores”) in Peru.10 52% of respondents who had bribed to obtain a driver’s
licence reported having paid the bribe to an agent, while the share was 15% or less for the
other nine activities reported in the summary statistics.11 The number of bribery episodes
per household is also understated because each respondent can only report one bribery
episode per year (per year per oﬃcial, in the Peruvian case). Another issue is that corrupt
oﬃcials may demand a fee that clients do not recognize as a bribe. Taking the various
factors into consideration, it seems inevitable that my surveys somewhat underestimate
bribery of public oﬃcials, but I do not believe the underestimation to be severe.
7Pro´ etica (2004).
8Transparency (2004).
9Pro´ etica (2004).
10Pro´ etica (2003).
11Bertrand et al. (2005) analyze the use of agents for obtaining drivers’ licences in India.
22Table 1: Bribery by victimization status 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
A. ICVS  Share individuals 
in category 
Category’s share of 
bribes 
Share of category 
bribing 
Victim of any of five crimes  46%  70%  19.0% 
Not victim  54%  30%  6.9% 
All individuals  100%  100%  12.5% 
B. ENAHO (Peru)  Share households 
in category 
Category’s share of 
bribery episodes 
Share of category 
with bribery episode
Victim of any of nine misfortunes  20%  37%  8.9% 
Not victim  80%  63%  3.9% 
All households  100%  100%  4.9% 
 
Notes: Based on 55,019 individuals in the ICVS and 35,964 households in the ENAHO. The five 
ICVS crimes are assault, burglary, larceny, robbery, and fraud. The nine household ENAHO 
misfortunes are criminal victimization, job loss, bankruptcy of a shop, death of an earner, serious 
illness or accident, desertion of household head, fire in house, shop or property, natural disaster and 
“other”. Bribery episodes include both bribes and refusals to bribe. Table 2: Criminal victimization and other misfortunes 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
A. ICVS  All 
individuals
 
Bribed 
Means for individuals who are a victim of 
listed misfortune 
  Share in category  Education 
(years) 
In town 
above 1 
million 
Age 
(1=16-19, 
12=70+) 
Crime 
was very 
serious 
Assault 0.041  0.080  11.4  0.46  4.7  0.34 
Burglary 0.074  0.121  11.2  0.40  5.2  0.33 
Larceny 0.173  0.277  12.0  0.44  5.2  0.28 
Robbery 0.027  0.051  11.3  0.52  4.9  0.43 
Fraud 0.294  0.508  12.2  0.48  5.5  -- 
No crime  0.539  0.300  10.5  0.34  6.2  -- 
Observations 55,019  6884  --  --  --  -- 
B. ENAHO (Peru)  All house-
holds 
Bribery 
episode
Means for households which are victim of 
listed misfortune 
  Share in category  Education 
(years) 
In town 
above 
500,000 
Age 
(years) 
Living 
standard 
fell 
Crime 0.034  0.098  8.1  0.18  41  0.39 
Job lost  0.042  0.085  9.8  0.35  38  0.55 
Shop bankruptcy  0.013  0.034  9.3  0.19  39  0.58 
Death of earner  0.010  0.019  7.3  0.11  43  0.51 
Serious illness, accident  0.045  0.083  7.5  0.17  43  0.50 
Desertion household head  0.007  0.012  8.4  0.17  34  0.55 
Fire in house shop property  0.001  0.003  7.0  0.15  40  0.36 
Natural disaster  0.054  0.055  5.4  0.01  44  0.35 
Other misfortune  0.008  0.028  7.9  0.14  42  0.52 
No misfortune  0.801  0.365  7.8  0.15  41  0.23 
Lost income if had 
misfortune 
0.131 0.227  --  --  --  -- 
Lost goods if had 
misfortune 
0.031 0.060  --  --  --  -- 
Lost income and goods  
if had misfortune 
0.026 0.055  --  --  --  -- 
Lost neither income nor  
goods if had misfortune 
0.012 0.024  --  --  --  -- 
Observations 35,964  1757  --  --  --  -- 
 
Notes: Examples of crimes given in the ENAHO questionnaire are robbery and assault. Examples 
of natural disasters given in the ENAHO questionnaire are drought, storm, plague [of insects], 
flood. Household size is censored at 6 or more in the ICVS data. The means for whether the crime 
was considered very serious are computed over the non-missing values (about 15% are missing). 
The question was not asked of victims of fraud. 
 Table 3: Bribery and usage of different types of official 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
A. ICVS  Share of bribes  Share households 
using official type
Share users 
bribing 
Number of 
bribes 
Government official  22%  --  --  1491 
Customs official  10%  --  --  711 
Police officer  34%  --  --  2362 
Inspector 11%  --  --  744 
Other 23%  --  --  1576 
Total 100%  -- -- 6884
 B. ENAHO (Peru)  Share of bribery 
episodes 
Share households 
using official type
Share users with 
bribery episode 
Number of 
bribery episodes
Police 35%  0.055  0.372  735 
Judiciary 12%  0.041  0.166  244 
Municipal 
government 
21% 0.256 0.048 440 
State schools  8%  0.539  0.008  162 
Other officials  24%  0.097  0.009  524 
Total 100%  --  --  2105 
 
Note: In panel B for other officials, columns 2 and 3 give the unweighted average across the 
different official types. The other officials are in social security, state banks, water, telephone, 
electricity, arbitration, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Industry and Tourism, SUNAT (customs 
and taxes), state hospitals, ID agency, Department of Migration, Election Office (ONPE), Election 
Court (JNE), development agency (FONCODES), nutritional welfare agency (PRONAA) and 
other. 
 Table 4: Effect of victimization on bribery in ICVS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Assaulted 7.51 
(10.6) 
5.79 
(9.1) 
5.69 
(8.0) 
5.38 
(8.6) 
9.66 
(4.2) 
Assaulted *  
     reported assault to police 
-- --  0.32 
(0.3) 
-- -- 
Burgled 3.36 
(7.0) 
2.93 
(6.5) 
2.92 
(5.5) 
2.94 
(7.0) 
3.34 
(2.3) 
Burgled *  
     reported burglary to police 
-- --  0.03 
(0.1) 
-- -- 
Larceny victim  4.89 
(14.8) 
3.13 
(9.2) 
3.33 
(7.5) 
3.11 
(11.2) 
3.40 
(2.6) 
Larceny victim *  
     reported larceny to police 
-- --  -0.54 
(-0.6) 
-- -- 
Robbed 6.14 
(6.0) 
5.14 
(5.5) 
4.94 
(4.9) 
5.14 
(6.5) 
6.26 
(2.5) 
Robbed *  
     reported robbery to police 
-- --  0.48 
(0.5) 
-- -- 
Defrauded 9.03 
(15.1) 
8.16 
(15.1) 
8.08 
(14.9) 
8.72 
(17.0) 
8.68 
(7.7) 
Defrauded *  
     reported fraud to police 
-- --  1.67 
(1.5) 
-- -- 
Income quartile, household, 
city size 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Other  covariates  No Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Countries All  All  All  Extended  Latin  America
R-squared  0.13 0.17 0.17 0.18  0.11 
Observations 55,019  78,383  7026 
 
Notes: Marginal effects of probits, multiplied by 100. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, 
adjusted for correlation within regions of countries. All regressions include three year dummies, 
household size dummies, country dummies, and a missing income quartile dummy. The “other 
covariates” are respondent sex, age, education and labor force status, and household ownership of 
vehicles. The sample of extended countries also includes those countries whose survey offered 
respondents who bribed a longer list of official types; in the specification for this sample the 
covariates include a dummy indicating these countries. 
 Table 5: Effect of victimization on bribery of different types of official in ICVS 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
 Gov’t  official Customs  Police  Inspector  Other 
Assaulted 1.96 
(5.9) 
1.95 
(4.9) 
1.66 
(5.8) 
1.62 
(3.4) 
1.64 
(4.7) 
Burgled 1.49 
(4.6) 
1.44 
(3.2) 
1.38 
(3.5) 
1.15 
(1.1) 
1.34 
(3.7) 
Victim of larceny  1.31 
(4.0) 
1.34 
(3.3) 
1.50 
(6.7) 
1.59 
(4.3) 
1.43 
(5.7) 
Robbed 1.40 
(2.2) 
2.37 
(4.5) 
1.84 
(5.9) 
1.31 
(1.2) 
1.35 
(1.8) 
Defrauded 2.49 
(10.7) 
2.21 
(8.8) 
2.15 
(10.1) 
2.50 
(7.4) 
2.54 
(10.4) 
 
Notes: Multinomial logit odds ratios. 55,019 observations. R
2=0.17. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses, adjusted for correlation within regions of countries. The omitted category is no bribe. 
The coefficients on Indonesia and Panama, for Inspector, and Brazil, for Other, are constrained to 
be zero. The country dummies for Botswana and South Africa, and Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary 
are combined. The unreported covariates are three year dummies; respondent sex, age, education 
and labor force status; household ownership of vehicles, size, income quartile, and city size.  
 Table 6: Effect of household criminal victimization on probability of a bribery episode in Peru’s 
ENAHO 
 
 Observations Mean 
dependent 
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Any official 
      
35,964 0.049  8.06 
(10.9) 
7.42 
(10.2) 
6.93 
(9.8) 
6.32 
(9.4) 
     R-squared      0.04  0.09  0.10  0.11 
B. Police                     
      
35,964 0.020  4.72 
(9.9) 
3.35 
(9.2) 
3.22 
(8.9) 
2.81 
(8.5) 
     R-squared      0.06  0.14  0.14  0.16 
C. Judiciary              
      
35,964 0.007  2.32 
(7.7) 
1.76 
(7.7) 
1.61 
(7.3) 
1.41 
(7.2) 
     R-squared      0.06  0.11  0.11  0.14 
D. Municipal government 
      
35,964 0.012  1.20 
(3.8) 
0.92 
(3.9) 
0.83 
(3.6) 
0.71 
(3.3) 
     R-squared      0.03  0.08  0.09  0.10 
E. Schools  
      
35,964 0.005  0.46 
(2.6) 
0.26 
(2.3) 
0.22 
(2.1) 
0.20 
(2.1) 
     R-squared      0.02  0.10  0.11  0.12 
F. Other officials  
    (17 types pooled)              
      
611,262 0.0009  0.066 
(4.5) 
0.050 
(4.3) 
0.045 
(4.1) 
0.037 
(3.9) 
     R-squared      0.07  0.11  0.11  0.12 
Other household misfortunes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City size, year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Official type dummies [panel F]  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Main household, respondent characteristics  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Change in household, town living standard dummies  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Consumption, vehicle ownership, food aid, job type  --  --  --  Yes 
 
Notes: Columns 1-4 contain marginal effects from probits, multiplied by 100. Each marginal effect 
is the marginal effect on the dummy for household criminal victimization from a different 
regression. T-statistics clustered by district are in parentheses. In panels A-E an observation is a 
household; in panel F it is a household-official pair. One region had no bribes to school officials and 
is combined with a neighboring region for the schools regressions containing region dummies. 
“Main household, respondent characteristics” are controls for age of respondent, its square, and 
respondent years of education; dummies for respondent sex, marital status, sex*marital status, and 
occupation in public administration; dummies for household region (24), size, acquisition of home 
through land invasion, presence of children aged 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, or 12-15; and a control for travel 
time to the district administrative center.  
 
 
 Table 7: Effect of household criminal victimization on probability of a bribery episode conditional 
on using official in Peru’s ENAHO 
 
 Observations Mean 
dependent 
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Police                     
      
1977 0.372  -0.78 
(-0.2) 
-0.20 
(-0.1) 
-1.04 
(-0.3) 
-1.91 
(-0.5) 
     R-squared      0.02  0.09  0.09  0.11 
B. Judiciary              
      
1470 0.166  15.41 
(3.6) 
14.72 
(3.6) 
14.16 
(3.5) 
15.27 
(3.7) 
     R-squared      0.03  0.10  0.10  0.12 
C. Municipal government 
      
9201 0.048  2.82 
(2.7) 
2.52 
(2.7) 
2.31 
(2.5) 
2.08 
(2.3) 
     R-squared      0.03  0.08  0.09  0.09 
D. Schools 
      
19,367 0.008  0.75 
(2.3) 
0.48 
(2.1) 
0.41 
(1.8) 
0.37 
(1.8) 
     R-squared      0.03  0.09  0.10  0.12 
E. Other officials  
    (17 types pooled)        
59,468 0.009  0.63 
(3.6) 
0.51 
(3.3) 
0.48 
(3.2) 
0.46 
(3.2) 
     R-squared      0.10  0.13  0.13  0.14 
Other household misfortunes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City size, year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Official type dummies [panel E]  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Main household, respondent characteristics  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Change in household, town living standard dummies  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Consumption, job type, vehicle ownership, food aid  --  --  --  Yes 
 
Notes: Columns 1-4 contain marginal effects from probits, multiplied by 100. Each marginal effect 
is the marginal effect on the dummy for household criminal victimization from a different 
regression. T-statistics clustered by district are in parentheses. In panels A-E an observation is a 
household; in panel E it is a household-official pair. One region had no bribes to school officials and 
is combined with a neighboring region for the schools regressions containing region dummies. 
“Main household, respondent characteristics” are controls for age of respondent, its square, and 
respondent years of education; dummies for respondent sex, marital status, sex*marital status, and 
occupation in public administration; dummies for household region (24), size, acquisition of home 
through land invasion, presence of children aged 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, or 12-15; and a control for travel 
time to the district administrative center. Table 8: Effect of household criminal victimization on probability of using official in Peru’s 
ENAHO 
 
 Observations Mean 
dependent 
variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Police                     
      
35,964 0.055  14.31 
(18.2) 
12.55 
(17.1) 
12.04 
(16.7) 
11.30 
(16.2) 
     R-squared      0.07  0.11  0.11  0.13 
B. Judiciary              
      
35,964 0.041  6.04 
(8.8) 
5.32 
(8.5) 
5.04 
(8.3) 
4.50 
(7.8) 
     R-squared      0.04  0.07  0.07  0.09 
C. Municipal government 
      
35,964 0.256  7.61 
(5.7) 
6.54 
(5.0) 
6.30 
(4.8) 
5.02 
(3.9) 
     R-squared      0.02  0.07  0.07  0.09 
D. Schools  
      
35,964 0.539  3.10 
(2.1) 
4.45 
(2.7) 
4.29 
(2.6) 
4.03 
(2.5) 
     R-squared      0.02  0.31  0.31  0.32 
E. Other officials  
     (17 types pooled)                   
611,262 0.097  0.97 
(4.9) 
1.07 
(6.8) 
1.02 
(6.6) 
0.75 
(5.3) 
     R-squared      0.28  0.30  0.30  0.31 
Other household misfortunes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City size, year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Official type dummies [panel E]  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Main household, respondent characteristics  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Change in household, town living standard dummies  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Consumption, job type, vehicle ownership, food aid  --  --  --  Yes 
 
Notes: Columns 1-4 contain marginal effects from probits, multiplied by 100. Each marginal effect 
is the marginal effect on the dummy for household criminal victimization from a different 
regression. T-statistics clustered by district are in parentheses. In panels A-D an observation is a 
household; in panel E it is a household-official pair. “Main household, respondent characteristics” 
are controls for age of respondent, its square, and respondent years of education; dummies for 
respondent sex, marital status, sex*marital status, and occupation in public administration; dummies 
for household region (24), size, acquisition of home through land invasion, presence of children 
aged 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, or 12-15; and a control for travel time to the district administrative center.  Table 9: Effect of misfortunes on probability of a bribery episode in Peru’s ENAHO 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
 Any 
official 
Police Judiciary Municipal 
gov’t 
Schools Other 
officials 
Victim of crime  6.32 
(9.4) 
2.81 
(8.5) 
1.41 
(7.2) 
0.71 
(3.3) 
0.20 
(2.1) 
0.037 
(3.9) 
Job lost  2.24 
(5.6) 
0.89 
(4.0) 
0.24 
(2.3) 
0.48 
(2.3) 
0.08 
(0.9) 
0.016 
(2.2) 
Shop bankrupted  3.14 
(4.1) 
0.94 
(2.9) 
0.74 
(3.7) 
0.34 
(1.2) 
0.32 
(1.9) 
0.014 
(1.2) 
Death of earner  3.84 
(3.9) 
1.41 
(2.6) 
0.04 
(0.1) 
0.79 
(1.9) 
0.34 
(1.7) 
0.050 
(2.6) 
Illness, accident  2.85 
(6.1) 
1.03 
(3.9) 
0.11 
(1.1) 
0.66 
(3.2) 
0.13 
(1.5) 
0.039 
(4.7) 
Desertion of household head  2.34 
(2.2) 
0.50 
(1.0) 
0.30 
(1.2) 
0.45 
(1.1) 
0.39 
(1.8) 
-0.004 
(-0.3) 
Fire in house, shop, property  4.89 
(1.6) 
4.23 
(2.3) 
2.20 
(1.9) 
-- --  0.041 
(1.0) 
Natural disaster  0.38 
(0.8) 
0.22 
(0.8) 
0.06 
(0.5) 
-0.01 
(-0.0) 
0.07 
(0.8) 
0.020 
(2.6) 
Other misfortune  8.85 
(7.6) 
3.28 
(5.4) 
1.34 
(4.8) 
2.17 
(4.3) 
0.70 
(2.7) 
0.058 
(3.3) 
City size, year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
All  other  covariates  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.11 0.16 0.14  0.10 0.12  0.16 
Observations 35,964  611,262 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from probits, multiplied by 100. T-statistics clustered by district are in 
parentheses. In columns 1-5 an observation is a household; in column 6 it is a household-official 
pair. There are too few bribes to municipal government and schools by victims of fire to include a 
dummy for this misfortune in the bribery regressions for municipal government and schools.  “All 
other covariates” are controls for age of respondent, its square, and respondent years of education; 
dummies for respondent sex, marital status, sex*marital status, job type and occupation in public 
administration; dummies for household region, size, acquisition of home through land invasion, 
presence of children aged 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, or 12-15, change in standard of living (including town) and 
food aid locations; controls for travel time to the district administrative center and log household 
consumption; and for column 6, official type dummies. 
 Table 10: Effect of misfortunes on the probability of using official and the probability of a bribery 
episode conditional on using official in Peru’s ENAHO 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
 Police  Judiciary  Municipal  gov’t 
 Usage  Bribery 
episode 
if usage 
Usage Bribery 
episode if 
usage 
Usage Bribery 
episode 
if usage 
Victim of crime  11.30 
(16.2) 
-1.91 
(-0.5) 
4.50 
(7.8) 
15.27 
(3.7) 
5.02 
(3.9) 
2.08 
(2.3) 
Job lost  2.47 
(5.2) 
5.40 
(1.3) 
2.28 
(5.9) 
0.75 
(0.3) 
4.62 
(4.2) 
1.26 
(1.5) 
Shop bankrupted  2.36 
(3.1) 
5.56 
(0.9) 
2.12 
(2.9) 
12.27 
(2.4) 
7.03 
(3.5) 
0.45 
(0.4) 
Illness, accident  2.81 
(5.1) 
5.85 
(1.2) 
1.53 
(3.7) 
0.60 
(0.2) 
2.17 
(1.7) 
2.36 
(2.5) 
Other misfortune  6.20 
(5.3) 
14.79 
(1.8) 
7.82 
(6.7) 
6.44 
(1.1) 
9.00 
(3.4) 
6.64 
(3.5) 
City size, year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
All  other  covariates  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.13 0.11 0.09  0.12 0.09  0.09 
Observations  35,964 1977 35,964  1470 35,964  9201 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from probits, multiplied by 100. T-statistics clustered by district are in 
parentheses. An observation is a household. “All other covariates” are controls for age of 
respondent, its square, and respondent years of education; dummies for respondent sex, marital 
status, sex*marital status, job type and occupation in public administration; dummies for household 
region, size, acquisition of home through land invasion, presence of children aged 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, or 
12-15, change in standard of living (including town) and food aid locations; and controls for travel 
time to the district administrative center and log household consumption. Table 11: Share of misfortune’s effect working through bribery conditional on use of official rather 
than through usage in Peru’s ENAHO 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Police  Judiciary  Municipal 
government 
Schools 
Victim of crime  -3%  47%  69%  87% 
Job  lost  24% 8% 59%  -- 
Shop  bankrupted  26% 59% 25%  -- 
Illness,  accident  24% 9% 85%  -- 
Other  misfortune  26% 17% 80%  -- 
 
Notes: The contribution of bribery conditional on usage is computed as the marginal effect of the 
misfortune on bribery conditional on use (Table 7 or 10) multiplied by the share of users using the 
official type. The contribution of usage is computed as the marginal effect of the misfortune on 
usage of the official (Table 8 or 9) multiplied by the share of users of that official type who have a 
bribery episode. Shares for schools are reported only for victims of crime, as the bribery conditional 
on use effects are estimated too imprecisely for the other misfortunes. 
  Appendix Table 1: Countries and survey years in ICVS sample 
Baltic 
 
Estonia (1995), Latvia (1996, 2000), Lithuania (1997). 
 
Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Czech Republic (1996), Hungary (1996), Poland (1992, 1996, 2000, 2000), Slovakia (1997). 
 
Balkans 
 
Albania (1996), Bulgaria (1997), Croatia (1997), Macedonia (1996), Romania (1996), Slovenia (1997), 
Yugoslavia (1996). 
 
Former Soviet Union 
 
Azerbaijan (2000), Belarus (1997), Georgia (1996, 2000), Kyrgyzstan (1996), Russia (1996), Ukraine 
(1997). 
 
Latin America 
 
Argentina (1996, 2001), Bolivia (1996), Brazil (1996), Colombia (1997, 2000), Costa Rica (1996), 
Panama (2000), Paraguay (1996). 
 
Africa 
 
Botswana (1997), Nigeria (1998), South Africa (1996), Uganda (1996), Zimbabwe (1996). 
 
Asia 
 
Cambodia (2001), India (1996), Indonesia (1996), Mongolia (1996, 2000), Philippines (1996, 2000). Appendix Table 2: Means of variables in ICVS (Standard deviations are in parentheses) 
 Full  sample Bribed
Top inc quartile 0.22 0.35 
4
th inc quartile 0.18 0.17 
3
rd inc quartile 0.23 0.20 
Bottom inc quartile 0.26 0.17 
Income missing 0.10 0.11 
City <10,000  0.12 0.03 
City 10-50,000  0.07 0.05 
City 50-100,000  0.07 0.06 
City 100-500,000  0.19 0.17 
City 500-1,000,000  0.17 0.18 
City 1,000,000+  0.39 0.51 
Own one car  0.33 0.38 
Own two cars  0.07 0.12 
Own three or more cars 0.02 0.04 
Own motorcycle or moped 0.13 0.21 
Own bike  0.49 0.53 
Age 16-19  0.06 0.06 
Age 20-24  0.11 0.16 
Age 25-29  0.11 0.16 
Age 30-34  0.11 0.15 
Age 35-39  0.11 0.14 
Age 40-44  0.10 0.10 
Age 45-49  0.09 0.09 
Age 50-54  0.07 0.06 
Age 55-59  0.06 0.04 
Age 60-64  0.05 0.02 
Age 65-69  0.05 0.01 
Age 70+  0.07 0.01 
Sex (female=1) 0.55 0.41 
Education (years) 11.1  (4.1) 12.3 (4.1)
Working 0.47 0.57 
Looking for work  0.10 0.11 
Keeping house  0.12 0.09 
Retired/disabled 0.19 0.06 
Student 0.08 0.11 
Other 0.05 0.06 
Household size (censored at 6) 3.7  (1.6) 4.0 (1.5)
Assaulted * reported assault to police 0.010 0.018 
Burgled * reported burglary to police 0.031 0.049 
Victim of larceny * reported larceny to police 0.056 0.088 
Robbed * reported robbery to police 0.008 0.016 
Defrauded * reported fraud to police 0.010 0.021 
Ex-communist country 0.61 0.50 
Latin American country 0.13 0.18 
Other developing country 0.26 0.32 
Observations 55,019 6884 Appendix Table 3: Means of household variables in Peru’s ENAHO  
(Standard deviations are in parentheses) 
 
 All 
households
Users of  
police 
Users of 
judiciary 
Users of 
municipal 
government 
Households 
with bribery 
episode 
Quarterly consumption - 
Nuevos Soles 
3226 
(2941) 
4880 
(4383) 
4588 
(3787) 
3902 
(3340) 
4433 
(3612) 
Travel time to district’s 
main town – minutes 
66 
(158) 
36 
(91) 
40 
(138) 
55 
(134) 
47 
(126) 
Town >500,000  0.15  0.26  0.18  0.13  0.20 
Town 100,000-500,000  0.22  0.26  0.29  0.23  0.27 
Town 50,000-100,000  0.06  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.10 
Town 20,000-50,000  0.08  0.10  0.11  0.10  0.10 
Town 2000-20,000  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.09 
Town 500-2000  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.08 
Town about 200  0.27  0.12  0.15  0.23  0.17 
Town about 100  0.10  0.05  0.06  0.08  0.06 
Own bike  0.27  0.35  0.34  0.32  0.36 
Own car, van  0.07  0.16  0.13  0.10  0.14 
Own tricycle, truck, taxi  0.06  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.11 
Own motorbike  0.03  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.06 
Residence by invasion  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.06 
Child aged 0-3 present  0.29  0.28  0.25  0.38  0.30 
Child aged 4-7  0.33  0.33  0.31  0.38  0.34 
Child aged 8-11 present  0.35  0.33  0.34  0.38  0.36 
Child aged 12-15 present  0.33  0.32  0.35  0.35  0.33 
Household size  4.4 (2.2)  4.4 (2.1)  4.4 (2.2)  4.8 (2.2)  4.5 (2.1) 
Living standard rose  0.08  0.14  0.11  0.10  0.14 
Living standard same  0.65  0.52  0.54  0.62  0.51 
Living standard fell  0.28  0.34  0.35  0.27  0.34 
Town living standrd rose  0.06  0.09  0.08  0.07  0.09 
Town living standrd same  0.71  0.61  0.60  0.67  0.59 
Town living standrd fell  0.24  0.31  0.32  0.25  0.33 
Food aid in: school  0.18  0.16  0.15  0.21  0.18 
     communal room  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.08  0.06 
     community dining hall  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.05 
     home  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
     municipal government  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.04 
     other house  0.17  0.14  0.12  0.18  0.15 
     health treatment  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01 
     church, other  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Observations 35,964  1977  1470  9201  1757 
 
Note: One Nuevo Sol is worth about 0.3 US cents. 
 Appendix Table 4: Means of respondent variables in Peru’s ENAHO 
(Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
 All 
households
Users of  
police 
Users of 
judiciary 
Users of 
municipal 
government 
Households 
with bribery 
episode 
Male  0.48 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.55 
Age 41 
(16) 
38 
(14) 
41 
(15) 
39 
(15) 
38 
(13) 
Years education  7.8 
(4.8) 
10.3 
(4.4) 
9.9 
(4.7) 
8.9 
(4.8) 
9.8 
(4.6) 
Married or cohabiting  0.64  0.64  0.56  0.68  0.65 
Married/cohabiting*male  0.32 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.37 
Not  employed  0.21 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.19 
Non-agricultural  employer  0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Agricultural  employer  0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Non-agricultural  
self-employed 
0.19 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.25 
Agricultural  self-employed  0.16 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.08 
White  collar  0.12 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.18 
Blue  collar  0.12 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.11 
Unpaid family worker  0.13  0.08  0.08  0.13  0.09 
Domestic or other worker  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02 
In public administration  0.06  0.10  0.11  0.09  0.09 
Observations 35,964  1977  1470  9201  1757 
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